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The United States Anny Recruiting Command (USAREC) came under the 
scrutiny of the United States Congress due to the size of their operations budget 
and the decreasing productivity of the recruiting forces. Due to this scrutiny, the 
GAO recommended that USAREC revise their quota based recruiting system 
because they found it to be inefficient. A quota based recruiting system only 
considers the future personnel needs of the Anny, and it is inefficient because it 
does not take into account environmental factors or the full potential of the 
personnel market. 
In this thesis, we present the Production Recruiting Incentive Model 
(PRIME), designed to improve the efficiency of the recruiting process. The 
pwpose of the PRIME is to motivate recruiters to access the maximum number of 
quality recruits possible during a period of time. The PRIME facilitates the capture of 
true market data in a region for USAREC. Recruiters predict the number of recruits 
they expect to access and USAREC can track the data and, over time, derive an 
accurate database of the true market potential in an area. These new data can be used 
to effectively manipulate the PRIME's optimum bonus points range to influence the 
quantity and quality of personnel accessed to fill the Anny's needs. The data can also 
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The Executive and Legislative branches of the United States Government 
are looking for ways to reduce spending within the Government. The largest areas 
of discretionary spending exist within the Department of Defense (DoD). 
Consequently, the DoD and all the Services within the DoD are experiencing a 
substantial reduction in the amount of resources they have at their disposal. 
Between FY1987 and FY1997 the size of the military will decline by 33% from 
about 2.2 million active duty troops to less than 1.5 million (Daggett, 1994, p.5). 
Over about the same period, between FY1989 and FY1999, DoD outlays, 
measured in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars, will decline by 38%. The DoD 
budget authority will decline by 42% between FY1985 and FY 1997 and then 
level off. The Army has experienced an overall 31% reduction in their resources 
to 24% of the total DoD budget. The reductions are causing all1evels of command 
and oversight to review the efficiency of operations. 
In March 1993, President Bill Clinton commissioned Vice President AI 
Gore to head the National Performance Review, an initiative to make Government 
bureaucracy more efficient by changing the way it goes about its work (Elkin, 
1993, p.IO). The National Performance Review has permeated all aspects of the 
DoD. This action initiated a review of the acquisition process within the 
Government and "streamlined" the way items are procured. Weapon systems are 
being evaluated in terms of effectiveness and efficiency to insure that they are 
necessary for the force. Training operations are being evaluated to insure they 
yield the greatest amount of training value for the resources expended. As with 
the other areas within the Army, the recruiting system is also being scrutinized. 
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The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) came under the 
scrutiny of the United States Congress due to the size of their operation budget and 
the decreasing productivity of the recruiting forces. Senator David Pryor, D-Ark., 
directed the General Accounting Office (GAO) to survey military recruiting 
operations and identify areas where the DoD could reduce its recruiting costs 
without adversely affecting its ability to meet military personnel requirements. 
The GAO provided several recommendations to the military Services that could 
make the Services recruiting programs more cost effective. They further 
recommended that the Services initiate the recommendations prior to requesting 
more funds for additional advertising and recruiters. One specific 
recommendation to USAREC from the GAO is to revise their quota based 
recruiting system because the GAO found the current system to be inefficient. The 
difficulty with this recommendation is that USAREC must remain within or reduce 
their operating expenses (General Accounting Office, 1993, pp. 2,68). The latest 
attempt to make themselves more efficient is with the Success 2000 quota based 
recruiting system initiated in 1994. This thesis will recommend a compensation 
system, building on Success 2000, that seeks to help the "foxhole"1 recruiter do 
their job by: rewarding them for their production, rewarding them equitably for 
their effort, and obtaining current and reliable field information on market 
potential. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to study an incentive system that sufficiently 
rewards recruiters for their work effort. We will propose an incentive matrix that 
wilJ, complement the current quota based recruiting system. We will outline a 
training plan for the implementation of the incentive matrix system. We will 
1 A foxhole recruiter is the actual person that contracts an individual into military Service. This excludes 
the support staff personnel. 
2 
discuss the necessity for high caliber recruits given the focus of the Army towards 
Force 21 and how an incentive matrix system will support these needs. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Will a Production Recruiter Incentive Model (PRIME) effectively motivate 
recruiters to access recruits up to the true market potential of their assigned geographic 
area and how can a PRIME be designed and applied within the current recruiting 
system? 
Subsidiaty Research Questions are: 
a. What type of incentive can be used to motivate the recruiters? 
b. Can the current quota system be replaced with the PRIME derived data 
and can a recruiter's mission be derived from a bi-directional 
information flow from the recruiters to USAREC via the PRIME? 
c. Will changes in the current system provide USAREC with more 
accurate market data on a particular geographic area and provide the 
true market potential of the area? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of the thesis is limited to deriving a Production Recruiter Incentive 
Model (PRIME) matrix and implementing it in a recruiting battalion. It will exclude 
discussion of specialty branches such as the Medical Services Corps and the Chaplains 
Corps. The thesis will consider incentives for recruiting personnel up to and including 
battalion support staff members. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
We began our study with interviews of a company leadership team (CLT) and 
recruiters in Chico, California. Concurrently, we interviewed USAREC staff from the 
Plans, Analysis, and Evaluation (P A&E) Directorate. Next, we reviewed past 
literature on the feasibility of the actual application of an incentive matrix to 
USAREC. Then we visited a recruiting battalion and interviewed their personnel from 
the Battalion Commander through actual recruiters. Their opinions on the concept of 
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an incentive based quota system and how to implement the system were solicited. 
From the information we derived an incentive matrix and provided it to the Albany, 
New York Recruiting Battalion for training and implementation. The Albany 
Recruiting Battalion implemented the system in March 1996 and they will use it until 
October 1996. An evaluation of the system's utility is ongoing and a final evaluation 
will be produced at the completion of the beta test. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I (Introduction): This chapter will discuss the purpose and focus of the 
thesis. It will identify the research objectives, the affected organizations, and the 
potential effects and ramifications of this type of incentive system. 
Chapter IT (Background): This chapter will describe the current budget 
trends and forecast within USAREC, identify the way the USAREC budget is 
broken-down and what part they control verses what is charged to their accounts 
that they cannot control. It will describe the current mission trends and the 
projections for accessions and what each on-production recruiter must access to 
make the overall mission. The chapter will also examine the current Success 2000 
program from the initial concept to how it actually functions. Then we will 
examine how Success 2000 has performed by looking at the trends from the 
stations performance and examine how a station can be successful and individual 
recruiters within the station not be successful. The chapter will review previous 
literature and studies on incentive models and their application to the recruiting 
process. It will briefly summarize the results of the studies and how these studies 
support this concept. 
_ , Chapter ill (PRIME ): The PRIME is an incentive matrix that will dictate the 
number of incentive award points a recruiter will receive for a certain number of 
accessments. The purpose of the PRIME is to motivate recruiters to access the 
maximum number of quality recruits possible during a period of time. The PRIME 
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will facilitate the capture of true market data in a region for USAREC. Recruiters will 
predict the number of recruits they expect to access and USAREC can track the data 
and, over time, derive an accurate data base of the true market potential in an area. 
These new data can be used to effectively manipulate the PRIME's optimum bonus 
points range to influence the quantity and quality of personnel accessed to fill the 
Army's needs. The data can also be used to realign and reassess the overhead cost 
associated with recruiting quality soldiers. 
This chapter will explain the process used to derive the PRIME matrix. First 
we will examine the concept of an incentive based quota system. Then work through 
the derivation of the PRIME table, examining the basis for the points, the working of 
the matrix and how it can influence human nature. Next we will review the calibration 
process of PRIME compared to historical accession data under Success 2000. Then 
we will consider the thought process of how to award points within a station for 
producers verses non-producers. Finally, we will look at the final PRIME 
table/system as delivered to the beta test unit and the functions the system performs. 
Chapter IV (Implementation): This chapter will define a methodology to 
implement the PRIME system within USAREC, focusing on the battalion level of 
command and how they train and track the system. We will consider the training 
issues surrounding the system, how to provide incentive points to station commanders 
and staff members, the bidding process, and the command and control mechanisms 
necessmy to implement PRIME. We will also address several command concerns that 
surround the program and what to realistically expect from the recruiters. 
Chapter V (Justification, Conclusions, and Recommendations): This 
chapter will make our conclusions and recommendations for the PRIME program 
to USAREC. All new activities and programs within the Army are focused on, 
and support the vision of Force XXI. Many new programs that cannot show a 
direct linkage to Force XXI, or that specifically support and complement this 
5 
vision, do not receive funding. We will discuss the Army's concept of Force XXI 
and how the application of PRIME to the recruiting process supports the vision of 




This chapter will describe the current budget trends and forecast within 
USAREC, identify the way the USAREC budget is broken-down and what part 
they control versus what is charged to their accounts that they cannot control. It 
will describe the current mission trends and the projections for accessions and 
what each foxhole recruiter must access to make the overall mission. The chapter 
will also examine the current Success 2000 program from the initial concept to 
how it actually functions. Then we will examine how Success 2000 has performed 
by looking at the trends from the stations and how a station can be successful and 
individual recruiters within the station not be successful. The chapter will review 
previous literature and studies on incentive models and their application to 
recruiting. It will briefly summarize the results of the studies and how these 
studies support this concept. 
B. FISCAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. USAREC Budget 
In the current fiscal situation, where the Executive and Legislative branches 
of the Unites States Government are cutting the amounts of discretionary spending, 
all areas of the DoD are experiencing cuts. As discussed earlier, the Army has 
absorbed an eight billion dollar reduction in overall budget authority over the last 
five years. USAREC is absorbing their share of the reduction. USAREC's 
budgetary high in 1987 was $1 billion, in constant 1996 dollars, their low in 1994 
was $560.5 million (USAREC Mission Brief, 1996, p. 5). · That represents a 44% 
decrease in funding. For 1996 and beyond into 2001, USAREC projects a 
relatively stable funding line of approximately $600 million each year bottoming 
7 
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Figure 2.1. USAREC Budget (in constant 96 dollars) 
Source: USAREC Mission Briefing, 1996, p. 5. 
2. Budget Breakdown 
The total operating budget of USAREC includes three separate accounts. 
The frrst is the Military Personnel Account (MPA) that includes the Army College 
Fund, Enlistment Bonuses, and Military Pay, this constitutes 57.5% of the FY1996 
budget. The MP A account is not controlled by USAREC. MP A is charged 
against USAREC's budget based on average personnel composite rates of their 
Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and their personnel's use of the 
college fund and bonuses. 
The second and third accounts come from USAREC 's Operations and 
Maintenance Army (OMA). This account is divided into two sections, one that 
USAREC directly controls (OMA 1) and the other that they do not control (OMA 
2). · OMA 1, that USAREC controls, includes civilian pay, advertising, recruiter 
aide support, recruiter support, training and communications which accounts for 
35.1% of the FY1996 budget. OMA 2, that USAREC does not control, contains 
the communications/automated data processing (ADP), facilities and keystone sub-
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accounts. The second portion constitutes 7.4% of their FY1996 budget.2 This 
breakdown of USAREC's budget shows that they have limited ability to control 
their total costs and the portion they can control is relatively small compared to the 
overall budget. Appendix A is a table of USAREC's "Big 10 budget" as of 18 
March 1996 in constant FY1996 dollars and depicts the budget breakdown. 
3. USAREC Budget Control 
Table 2.1 depicts USAREC's FY1996 budget breakdown by major account 
category and percentage of the total budget. 
Table 2.1. USAREC's FY 1996 Budget 
$Millions %of Total Account Totals %of 
Total 
MPA ARMY COLLEGE FUND 62.7 10.2 
ENLISTMENT BONUS 16.6 2.7 (TOTALMPA) 
MILITARY PAY 275.4 44.7 354.7 57.5 
OMA1 CIVILIAN PAY 43.3 7.0 
ADVERTISING 70.6 11.4 
RECRUITER AIDE SUPPORT 0 0.0 
RECRUITER SUPPORT 82.4 13.4 
TRAINING 4 0.6 (TOTAL OMA 1) 
COMMUNICATIONS 16.3 2.6 216.6 35.1 
OMAl COMMUNICATIONS/ADP 1.2 0.2 
KEYSTONE (REQUEST-MS5B) 7.3 1.2 (TOTAL OMA 2) 
FACILITIES (QLEA) 36.9 6.0 45.4 7.4 
TOTALBIG10 616.7 100.0 
Source: USAREC Mission Briefing, 1996, p. 5. 
Historically USAREC has the ability to actively influence from 28% to 
37%,of their overall budget. The actively influenced percentage is represented by 
the OMA 1 category of accounts and they are projected to stabilize around 36% 
2 For a more in-depth description of the accounting system within USAREC, see Lyons and Riester, "U.S. 
Army Recruiting: A Critical Analysis of Unit Costing and the Introduction of a Recruiting Bonus 
Incentive Model." MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993, pp. 30-36. 
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through the end of the centmy. Figure 2.2 depicts the USAREC's historical 
percentage .of OMA 1 accounts compared to the total USAREC budget. The 
limited amount of influence they have over their total budget is a primary reason 
USAREC must focus on conserving their limited resources and making the best 
possible allocation of those resources. An incentive matrix system that derives a 
self selected accession number will assist USAREC in further focusing their 
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Figure 2.2. OMA 1 Accounts as a Percentage of Total Budget 
(in constant 96 dollars) 
Source: USAREC Mission Briefing, 1996, p. 5. 
4. Unit Cost Trends 
Unit cost is defmed as the sum of all expenditures on recruiting efforts 
divided by the number of recruits accessed (Lyons and Riester, 1993, p. 24). This 
measurement has varied widely over the last nineteen years. The lowest year was 
FY1983 where the unit cost per accession was $5,774, in FY1996 dollars. The 
hig4~st year in the time span was FY1995 when the cost was $9,870, in FY1996 
dollars. Figure 2.3 depicts the unit cost per recruit based on the total USAREC 
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Figure 2.3. Unit Cost per Recruit, Base on the Total Budget 
(in constant 96 dollars) 
Source: USAREC Mission Briefing, 1996, p. 5. 
C. MISSION TRENDS 
1. Mission 
The nwnber of recruits that USAREC is directed to access is a function of 
the strategic requirements process as opposed to achieving a free market 
equilibriwn (Lyons and Riester, 1993, p. 9). The Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Personnel (DCSPER) directs USAREC to access a certain nwnber of recruits per 
year based on future force projections and funding. These figures are derived from 
the National Military Strategy Docwnent, Defense Planning Guidance and several 
other planning and programming docwnents (Terasawa, Kang, Riester and Lyons, 
1994, p. 16). The trend of the Army's active duty end-strength nwnbers over the 
last sixteen years is downward. Figure 2.4 presents selected years of the Army's 
active duty end-strength numbers. The data for FY1988 were not available in the 




















FY87 FY89 FY91 FY93 FY95 FY97 FY99 
SELECTED YEARS 
(Years selected based on subs1antial change in end-strength) 
*FY88 is an estimate, the data is missing. 
-FY97 ..01 are es1imates based on current trends. 
FY01 
Figure 2.4. Army Personnel End-Strength Levels (selected years) 
Source: Graney, 1995, p. 22. 
2. Army Manning Trends 
The projected active duty end-strength after FY1997 is 475,000. These 
end-strength figures are maintained by the numbers of recruits accessed into the 
Army each year. The past and projected enlisted accessions are depicted in Figure 
2.5. The graph depicts a high accession requirement in FY1983 of 145,337, which 
happened to fall during the Reagan build-up era. FY1983 is also the year when 
the unit cost to access recruits was the lowest. The low accession requirement 
year is FY1995, when it was 62,931. This is the year with the highest unit cost per 
recruit and it was in the height of the post cold-war draw down. Now that the 
Army is almost to a steady state, USAREC must increase accessions to make up 
for the reduction in personnel lost to the draw down and attrition. Their accession 
req~~ement is pr~jected to increase by 20,000 personnel or 22% between FY1996 
and FY1997. USAREC projects a steady state of accessions after FY1997, to 
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Figure 2.5. Annual Enlisted Accession Requirements 
Source: USAREC Mission Briefing, 1996, p. 5. 
Based on the increase in current accession projections and the projected 
end-strength of on-production recruiters, it is necessary for recruiters to increase 
their accession numbers in the future. In FY1995 recruiters needed to access 12.7 
recruits each. In FY1997 that figure will increase to 18.3 per recruiter. The last 
time the accessions per recruiter number was that high was in FY1990. See Figure 
2.6 for a graphical representation of the number of accessions per on-production 
recruiter that USAREC must average annually to meet their accession 
requirements. Historically, USAREC has accessed their DCSPER dictated 
national requirements. They have accomplished this using several methods. One 
is to reduce the quality of the soldiers accessed and another is to increase the 
advertising campaign funding. They have also implemented several recruiter 
focused programs to "streamline" or refocus the efforts of the organization, one of 
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Figure 2.6. Annual Average Number of Accessions per 
On-Production Recruiter 
Source: USAREC Mission Briefing, 1996, p. 5. 
D. SUCCESS 2000 
1. Success 2000 Concept 
To facilitate achieving their requirements, USAREC is currently using a 
recruiting system called Success 2000. Success 2000 attempted to elevate some of 
the problems associated with the old recruiting system and make USAREC more 
efficient. The strategy of Success 2000 involves developing and introducing state-
of-the-art sales management techniques incorporated with automated data 
processmg equipment to speed response time and introduce the following 
principles: 
a. To simplify the mission and enhance teamwork at station level for a 
more efficient, more productive recruiting force. 
b. To expand the authority, autonomy, and flexibility afforded the 
recruiting station commander. 
·, c. To change the methodology for measuring success to focus leaders 
on those essential elements necessary to achieve success at all levels, 
thus decreasing the disparity between a successful USAREC and an 
unsuccessful recruiting force (Recruiter Journal, 1993, p. 12). 
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2. Success 2000 Implementation 
The frrst principle was accomplished by reducing the number of recruit 
categories from 20 to three for the Regular Army (RA) and three for the Army 
Reserve (AR). The crafters of Success 2000 wanted to enhance teamwork within 
stations and consequently stopped assigning quotas to individual recruiters. Now 
the station receives the quota and the recruiters work together to fulfill the mission. 
The second principle is designed to empower the Recruiting Station Commander 
(RSC) by giving him more authority and flexibility in the execution of his duties. 
The third principle of Success 2000 changed the way USAREC measures success. 
Before Success 2000, success was measured on the basis of accessing a specific 
number of recruits each accounting period. This process is called attaining 
"mission box." Mission box was measured and tracked from the on-production 
recruiter level up through the brigade. Now, mission box measurements start at 
the station level and accumulate up the Chain-of-Command. 
Mission box is the process of accessing specific numbers of recruits in 
individual categories. The categories under Success 2000 for active-duty recruits 
are high school graduate-alphas (GA), high school senior-alphas (SA), and others. 
Each station receives a specific requirement, by category of recruit, to access per 
accoWlting period. The recruiter's goal is to access, at a minimum, the number 
specified or more if possible during the period. If the station accomplishes this 
mission, then they receive mission box and the incentive points associated with 
that accomplishment. For example, Chico Station is directed to access three GAs, 
four SAs and one other during the month of July. All the individual on-production 
recruiters within the· station are expected to contribute to the stations mission. If 
the accumulation of all the on-production recruiters accessions during the 
accounting period are less than the required number in any category, then the 
station does not earn mission box or the incentive points associated with attaining 
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the mark. 
Under Success 2000, companies, battalions, and brigades are evaluated and 
compared based on the cumulative number of accessions of the stations under their 
command. In other words, stations and commands are assessed volumetrically. A 
concern over this system is that a higher command can be successful and the lower 
ones not be successful. A company can conceivably have only three of twenty-
five stations actually achieve mission box and still make the company level 
mission box. The key is that the accessions, by category of recruits, add up to the 
next higher level of commands requirement. Making mission box is an important 
evaluation factor used by the USAREC command to assess the performance of 
their subordinate commands. Consequently, it is an important factor to the 
subordinate commanders and they align/staff their commands to maximize their 
potential of making mission box. 
The monthly accounting cycle under Success 2000 also influences 
accession numbers. Assume a station worked a market for a month and at the end 
of the month it is obvious that they will not make mission box. If a recruiter 
within that station has a prospective recruit ready to sign a contract, but adding 
that one recruit will not put the station over the mission box standard, he does not 
have any motivation to contract the soldier in that month. Often times the recruiter 
will decide to hold the recruit over until the next accounting period. This activity 
is called "hippocketing" or "sandbagging." Hippocketing or sandbagging are 
methods of timing an enlistment so that it does the most good for the individual 
recruiter and the station. Individually, this phenomena has little impact on 
recruiter efficiency, collectively it can impact on USAREC's efficiency. 
A method used to motivate individual on-production recruiters to recruit 
and reduce sandbagging is to issue awards based on the number of incentive award 
points they accumulate over time. The incentive award points are used to earn 
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recognition through the award of individual uniform badges, rings, and medallions. 
These awards distinguish a recruiter's recruiting accomplishments from their 
peers. The standard awards earned by a recruiter can be augmented by individual 
commands in other ways to incentivise them to access as many personnel as 
possible. Some commands give sweat suits, garment bags, and unit coins. 
Incentive award points are earned based on the amount and category of recruits a 
recruiter accesses. 
The recruiter also receives station incentive points if the station makes 
mission box. Station mission box is a team effort. Station points are points given 
to each member of a station when they access their quota of recruits per the 
accounting period. If the station needs more than one accession to make the 
mission and no other recruiters in the station have any prospects working, the 
station will not be better off with one extra accession. A recruiter will not be any 
better off accessing the recruit. In this situation a common course of action is to 
sandbag the recruit over until the next accounting period where the accession can 
yield more incentive points. 
Company and battalion leadership teams assess their markets to determine 
which one produces the most recruits and then they often assign their best 
recruiters to work that market. They expect that specific station servicing the 
market to make up a large proportion of their command's mission. This practice 
can take valuable expertise and experience away from the markets that do not have 
a large market potential. This reduces the caliber of the sales force in these areas 
and ultimately reduces the already low potential of the market. 
3. Success 2000 Performance 
Success 2000 has experienced varying measures of success. USAREC is 
accessing the numbers of recruits necessary to support their current mission. 
Success 2000 was implemented during a lull in accession requirements and the 
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market has not been overly taxed since its implementation. FY1997 is the frrst 
year since the implementation of Success 2000 that the accession numbers will 
start to stress the national market for recruits. Previously the number of accessions 
was relatively low, 62,931 in FY1995 and 70,000 in FY1996. In FY1997 that 
figure jumps to 89,500, a 22% increase in accessions (Maze, 1996, p. 3). 
The individual stations in the United States have experienced marginal 
success under Success 2000. Since Success 2000 was implemented, USAREC has 
maintained a data base of all the stations within the United States. The data start 
in January 1995 through March 1996, as of the writing of this document. The data 
show that the most successful month to date is December 1995 at 61% successful 
stations. That is not the norm. Of the fifteen months of available data, the average 
was below 50% in thirteen months. Figure 2. 7 shows the percentage of successful 
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Figure 2. 7. Percentage of Successful Stations in USAREC under Success 2000 
Source: Data supplied by USAREC. 
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E. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
1. Analysis of Unit Costing of USAREC 
This is a study conducted by Professors Katsuaki L. Terasawa and Keebom 
Kang and two masters students, CPT Betsey Riester and CPT Stephen Lyons from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. They considered the 
restrictive labor pool the military draws recruits from versus the cost associated 
with accessing those higher quality personnel. In the current fiscal environment of 
reduced resources for the United States Army Recruiting Command, the challenge 
is to do more with less and still maintain a quality fighting force. The study 
examined USAREC's budget versus their cost to access these soldiers and how 
unit costing supports their efforts. 
They examined the supply, demand, and policy issues relating to quality 
requirements that effect recruiting efforts. They did an in-depth analysis of 
USAREC's implementation of the unit costing concept. They examined what 
constitutes the make-up of cost-per-accession and discussed the recruiting budget. 
Finally, they identified some of the limitations associated with using unit cost to 
measure effectiveness in this environment. 
They concluded that the unit cost measurements USAREC was using, as 
USAREC defined unit cost, fell short of providing the necessary information for 
management to make cost cut decisions in the most efficient manner. They found 
that the unit cost concept is overly simplistic and should not be the basis for 
making resource decisions. This fmding is derived because USAREC only 
directly controls approximately 30% of their total budget. The other 70% is 
charged to their accounts as overhead and personnel pay type debits. In order to 
allocate resources effectively leaders must be in control of their own resources. 
Another shortfall, is that unit cost is only capable of providing a one time snapshot 
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of recruiting costs. It does not reflect the marginal cost or life-cycle cost of a 
recruit (Terasawa, Kang, Riester and Lyons, 1994, pp. 3,28). 
2. Quota Based Recruiting System and Bonus Incentive 
Recruiting Model 
This study by the same authors as the last paper, defmes the difficult work 
environment recruiters are forced to work in, where they are a hero one month and 
a heel the next month based on how they perform against a directed quota. The 
success of a recruiter is measured on their attaining a quota, rather than 
maximizing their market potential. Under the quota-based system the team found 
that recruiters have little incentive to exceed their quota. This environment breeds 
risk-averse behavior on the part of the recruiters. The study gives an overview of 
the current quota allocation procedure, from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army 
(Personnel) through USAREC, down to the recruiter and the ramifications of this 
system. 
The hypothesis of the paper is that the quota system results in inefficiencies 
in the market. The study uses three hypothetical scenarios to illustrate their point 
of inefficiency in the current system. The scenarios are based on a spreadsheet 
model of recruiter performance using two assumptions: first, the quotas are 
established at a production level that is lower than the true market potential; 
second, a recruiter will maximize their utility consistent with the established 
incentive structure. Their model showed that, as the probability of achieving a 
specified quota increased, the efficiency rating of the market decreased. For 
example, if USAREC is experiencing a 90% success rate, across the board for 
recruiters, they are only accessing 72% of the available market. This percentage 
trend' was consistent throughout their test. Next, the study derives the concept of a 
Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model that: 
a. Provides an incentive for recruiters to surpass quotas and thereby 
maximize true market potential. 
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b. Rewards recruiters with monetary bonuses based on their work effort 
and their ability to forecast. 
c. Rewards recruiters equitably despite inherent regional market 
differences in the long run. 
d. Provides, in the long run, USAREC headquarters with valuable 
market information that allows for efficient future resource 
reallocation to the productive regions. 
e. Helps reduce the tendency for recruiters to delay or hold applicants 
for future months, there by improving market information to 
USAREC headquarters. 
f. Based on improved forecasting information, the bonus model 
indirectly reduces staff workload and may minimize the variance in 
the mission process. 
g. Model is adjustable to reflect changing Army accession 
requirements. 
h. Model is capable of maintaining quality marks. 
They concluded that the current quota system implies potential 
inefficiencies in its resource allocation and that the bonus incentive program is a 
viable method of correcting these inefficiencies. They recommended the 
USAREC develop a lab-based experiment to test the model and follow that with a 
beta test of a recruiting region (Terasawa, Kang, Lyons and Riester, 1994, p. 
1,6,9). 
3. Feasibility of Monetary Incentives within the USAREC 
This thesis, by Joseph Anderson and Marvin Whitaker, examined the 
potential issues of a monetary based incentive program within USAREC. This 
thesis is a direct follow-on study to the previous literature discussed. The 
monetary based incentive program is used as a means to increase individual 
recruiter productivity, which will allow USAREC to allocate resources more 
efficiently. 
Their experiments indicate that simulated monetary bonuses motivated 
actual recruiters to increase their estimated recruit production. They believe that 
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the Bonus Incentive Recruiting Model (BIRM) mechanism provides the best 
opportunity. for efficient resource allocation within USAREC and they recommend 
USAREC implement an experiment with the model (Anderson and Whitaker, 
1994, p. V). 
4. A Critical Analysis of Unit Costing and the Introduction of a 
Bonus Incentive Model 
This thesis, by Stephen Lyons and Betsey Riester, is a direct follow-on to 
the first two articles. They combine the unit costing discussion and the Bonus 
Incentive Model concept into one document and provide conclusions and a 
recommendation for implementation. ·Their conclusions and recommendations are 
the same as the first two articles. They conclude that unit costing serves to focus 
manager's attention on the problems associated with resource conservation and 
that it has severe limitations as a performance measure and policy tool. They also 
recommend that USAREC develop and explore ·a test bed recruiting region to 
implement the incentive model (Lyons and Riester, 1993, pp. 65,69). 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we described the current fiscal environment within the 
United States and the DoD. Currently, all forms of discretionary spending are 
being reduced and that trend is expected to continue. USAREC's budget has 
reduced 44% since FY1987. Their budget is expected to level out at 
approximately $600 million in FY1997 through FY200I. 
USAREC's budget is broken into three major accmmts, the Military 
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Personnel Account (MP A), and the Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) 
that is divided into two sections, OMA I and OMA 2. MPA represents 57.5% of 
the FYI996 USAREC budget. OMA I represents 35.I% of the budget and OMA 
2 represents the remaining 7.4%. Of all the accounts, USAREC only controls the 
OMA 1 account. The other accounts are used by the Department of the Army to 
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charge overhead and personnel cost to, in the name of USAREC. USAREC 
cannot control how much or influence what is applied to these accounts. 
USAREC has used unit costing as a method of gauging the increase or 
decrease in accessing a recruit into the military. Unit cost is the total amount of 
budget for the command divided by the number of recruits accessed. Historically, 
the unit cost of accessing a recruit has risen. The amount of recruits accessed 
annually, changes more rapidly than the budget authority allocated to USAREC. 
Consequently, the budget process is constantly reacting to the Army's assessment 
needs and this situation produces periods of excess and lean financial times. This 
environment makes it difficult for USAREC to make long range budget plans and 
reduces their ability to effectively compensate for the fluctuations. 
Next we examined the way USAREC receives their accession mission. The 
mission is derived by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) based on 
the National Military Strategy Document, Defense Planning Guidance and several 
other documents. Then we looked at the future Army end-strength projections and 
what USAREC projects they will have to access to support the Army's needs. In 
FY1997 they expect to access 70,000 enlisted personnel. Based on the projections 
we examined the average number of accessions each recruiter had to produce to 
meet the USAREC mission. In FY1997 that figure is 18.3 recruits per recruiter 
compared to 12.7 in FY1995. That is a 30% increase in accessions per recruiter. 
To assist them in their mission, USAREC is currently using a recruiting 
system called Success 2000. The system is based on the following principles: 
a. To simplify the mission and enhance teamwork at station level for a 
more efficient, more productive recruiting force. 
b. To expand the authority, autonomy, and flexibility afforded the 
recruiting station commander. 
c. To change the methodology for measuring success to focus leaders 
on those essential elements necessary to achieve success at all levels, 
thus decreasing the disparity between a successful USAREC and an 
unsuccessful recruiting force (Recruiter Journal, 1993, p. 1~). 
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Success 2000 reduced the number of categories of recruits and focused on 
the teaming aspects of the recruiting station to accomplish their mission rather than 
individual effort. This effectively simplified the process of accounting for and 
identifying recruits while increasing station commander responsibility. These 
actions helped to streamline the recruiting process, but did not necessarily increase 
efficiency. 
USAREC has been successful with the program while stations are 
unsuccessful making their accession mission. If the major command is successful 
then the sum of its parts should be successful. That is not the case using Success 
2000 and it points towards some form of inefficiency in the system. Since the 
implementation of the program the best month is December 1995 when 61% of the 
stations in the United States successfully made mission box. The great 
preponderance of the months since the inception of Success 2000 have had less 
than 50% of the stations make mission box. PRIME is designed to remedy this 
and several other problems associated with the current system. 
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III. PRODUCTION RECRUITER INCENTIVE MODEL (PRIME) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The PRIME is an incentive system that derives the nwnber of incentive award 
points a recruiter receives for a certain nwnber of accessments. The purpose of the 
PRIME is to motivate recruiters to access the maximwn nwnber of quality recruits 
possible during a period of time. The PRIME system will facilitate the capture of true 
market data in a region for USAREC. Recruiters will predict the actual nwnber of 
recruits they expect to access and USAREC can track the data and, over time, derive 
an accurate data base of an area's true market potential. These new data can be used 
to effectively manipulate the PRIME's optimwn bonus point range to influence the 
quantity and quality of personnel accessed to fill the Army's needs. The data can also 
be used to realign and reassess the overhead cost associated with recruiting quality 
soldiers. 
This chapter will explain the process used to derive the PRIME matrix. First 
we will examine the concept of an incentive based quota system. Then work through 
the derivation of the PRIME table, examining the basis for the points, the working of 
the matrix and how it can influence hwnan nature. Next we will review the calibration 
process of PRIME compared to historical accession data under Success 2000. Then 
we will consider the thought process of how to award points within a station for 
producers verses non-producers. Finally, we will look at the fmal PRIME 
table/system as delivered to the beta test unit and the functions the system performs. 
B. CONCEPT 
PRIME is designed to build on the strengths of the Success 2000 program 
and adds a dimension of self-selection and ownership of the accession mission for 
an individual recruiter. The PRIME system was developed at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California by Professor K. L. Terasawa and 
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Professor Keebom Kang in I993 as an alternative to the quota-based recruiting 
practice (Terasawa, Kang, Lyons and Riester, I994, p.l 0). The Professors 
reasoned that on-production recruiters would have the best market data available 
on their region. The recruiters know about the human element, cyclic nature of the 
market, industry trends, and socio-economic factors affecting a market. They are 
in the best position to apply this knowledge to a prediction of future performance. 
The concept is to have the recruiters, in their specific market, self-select 
their mission based on their knowledge. The recruiter's individual missions will 
roll-up and become the station's mission and this figure rolls-up the line to become 
the company's mission and so on through the brigade. Conducting a statistical 
analysis of the accuracy of the recruiter's ability to attain their predictions and the 
variance from their predictions will yield exceptionally accurate historical 
accession market data. The historical data derived on the market will allow 
USAREC to better allocate their scarce resources based on the true market data. 
C. PRIME TABLE 
The primary features of the PRIME are a truth-telling mechanism, 
efficiency-enhancing system, and a jump-point incentive award point system. The 
truth-telling mechanism is when a recruiter predicts a specific number of 
anticipated recruits within a quarter and is motivated to attain that number. Given 
that the recruiter actually accesses the number of recruits predicted, they will 
receive the maximum number of incentive award points available. It is in the best 
interest of the recruiter to accurately predict and access that number of recruits. 
The system is efficiency-enhancing because given a predicted number of 
five. ,the incentive .award points increase as production increases. At a prediction 
point of five, if the recruiter accesses five, they receive I70 points (See Figure 
3.I). If they actually access six recruits they receive 200 points. If they access 
four recruits they receive II 0 points. Therefore, a recruiter gains more additional 
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points if they overproduce versus a significantly smaller number of points for 
underproduction. The optimum number of points a recruiter can receive is when 
they accurately predict and access their prediction number. This concept motivates 
the recruiter to be as efficient as possible during the quarter. 
The jump-point is the point, identified by USAREC, where the incentive 
award points for accession will increase substantially. On the matrix in Figure 3.1, 
the jump-points are positioned at accession predictions of six and nine. At a 
prediction of six, the points jump 90. At the next jump-point, nine, they jump 160 
points. Based on USAREC's projection of the level of production needed from 
on-production recruiters they can adjust the jump-points to influence the recruiters 
predictions. This example table shows where the emphasis is for this quarterly 
self-determined mission, six and nine. We are counting on human nature to strive 
towards the performance level that yields the largest pay-off. 
460 470 530 570 620 750 
490 500 560 600 650 780 850 
Figure 3.1. Example PRIME Table for Graduate-Alpha (GA) 
Source: Terasawa, USAREC Briefing, 1995, p. 7. 
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D. TABLE DERIVATION 
1. Points 
PRIME is designed to produce approximately the same number of incentive 
points per level of output, for an average recruiter, as Success 2000. PRIME takes 
into account all the points a recruiter can receive under the old program such as 
shipping points, commanders bonus points, the varying point structure for specific 
categories of recruits, and shipping losses for the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). 
Under Success 2000 each category of recruit accessed receives a variable amount 
of points based on their quality and caliber. For example, a graduate-alpha (GA) 
receives 30 points and a senior-alpha (SA) receives 20 points (See Appendix B). 
The various bonus incentive points assigned to a specific category of recruit were 
reduced to a multiplier reflecting their relative worth using a graduate-alpha (GA) 
as the baseline or award multiplier value of one. 
Using a GA as a baseline and an award multiplier of one, one times the 
points received for accessing oneGA of 30, yields 30 points. Using the Incentive 
Award Point Update 1st Quarter FY1996 in Appendix B, as the point of reference 
for the multipliers, the ratios of categories were derived. Under this document, a 
senior-alpha (SA), is worth 20 points. Under PRIME, SAs are worth 2/3 of the 
baseline calculation. Two thirds of 30 yields 20 points. This common theme 
(award multiplier) is applied to all the categories of recruits. See Figure 3.2 for the 
breakdown of award multipliers per accession category. This type of a points 
calculation system adds a degree of flexibility not seen under the old system. 
USAREC can change the baseline points and not have to change the entire system 






Award Multiplier Army Reserve Award Multiplier 
1 Grad/Currently-Alpha 5/6 
2/3 Prior Service 1/2 
1/3 Other 1/3 
Figure 3.2. Example Award Multipliers Using GA as the Baseline 
Source: Terasawa, USAREC Briefing, 1996, p.8. 
2. Matrix 
The PRIME points system concentrates on maximizing incentive points 
around the number of accessions USAREC needs each recruiter to produce during 
one quarter. For FY1997, USAREC needs approximately 19 recruits from each 
on-production recruiter for the year. Divided by four quarters that yields 
approximately five recruits per on-production recruiter per quarter. In whole 
numbers, that equals two recruits per month per recruiter. This became the 
baseline and focal point of the matrix. This is the accession point where we want 
all recruiters to focus their efforts. If all the recruiters in USAREC access two 
recruits per month, six per quarter, the command will easily make their current 
accession misston. 
Taking all this into consideration, it was necessary to determine how to 
motivate the individual recruiters to predict a number that would support the 
mission while effectively rewarding overproduction and reducing the award for 
underproduction. Another major consideration was how to motivate on-
production recruiters to predict, as accurately as possible, their future accessions. 
Motivating a recruiter to predict a number of accessions that support the 
USAREC mission is accomplished using the concept of "jump-points" within the 
matrix. Refemng back to Figure 3.1, the jump-points are at prediction levels of 
six and nine. A jump-point is a point on the matrix where the increase in points 
for each successive recruit accessed increases substantially more than at previous 
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levels. In order to support the USAREC quota, we chose to place the first jump-
point at the prediction level of six accessions per quarter. If all the on-production 
recruiters in USAREC accessed at this level, the command would make their 
DCSPER directed mission. It is not reasonable to expect all on-production 
recruiters to make that number of accessions, so some will have to overproduce to 
make up for the shortfalls. USAREC wants overproduction from the recruiters that 
have the ability. Consequently, the next jump-point is at a level of nine to 
motivate these recruiters to achieve three accessions per month. This next level of 
performance is focused on the recruiters with exceptional recruiting ability and is 
incorporated to challenge their ability and help make up for the shortfall in 
accessions of some of the weaker recruiters. 
The next concern that needs addressing is the attribute of effectively 
rewarding overproduction and reducing the reward for underproduction. When a 
recruiter predicts his level of performance for a quarter, he signs-up for that level 
of production and that is where he is expected to perform. If he has the ability to 
overproduce, the matrix must yield enough incentive points, that the added effort 
needed to yield the extra production exist to motivate the recruiter to actually 
access recruits and not sandbag them into the next accounting period. Conversely, 
if a recruiter is coming up to the end of an accounting period and they have not 
accessed their predicted level of recruits often they have a tendency to "give up" 
and marshal their resources for the next accounting period. We want to reduce the 
amount of incentive award points received for underproduction enough to motivate 
them to continue to recruit. This concern is addressed by making their predicted 
level of performance (optimum point ridge) be the maximum amount of points 
available at any level of petfonnance. The reduction in points received for not 
attaining the predicted level of performance is a variable based on where they 
performed, under or over their prediction. 
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The optimum point ridge is a level of accessions represented by a ridge of 
maximum points that flows down the points matrix (z-axis) in a diagonal direction, 
corresponding with equal levels of prediction (x-axis) and production (y-axis). 
See Figure 3.3 for a 3-dimensional graphical representation of the PRIME points 
curve. On the positive side (overproduction) of a specific prediction level, the 
points increase up to but not beyond the next predicted level's point value. So, 
overproduction yields a high level of points, but not as high as if the recruiter had 
originally predicted that overproduction number at the beginning of the accounting 
period. If the recruiter does not access up to their predicted level 
(underproduction), they receive fewer points for their accessions than if they had 
accurately predicted the lower number at the beginning of the accounting period. 
Notice the ridge that runs from the top of the graph down to the bottom. This 
represents the optimum prediction and performance range. The left side 
(underproduction) has a greater slope that represents a sharper decrease of reward 
points for underproduction. The right side (overproduction) has a gentler slope 








Figure 3.3. 3-Dimensional Representation of the Optimum Points Ridge 
Source: Terasawa, USAREC Briefing, 1996, p. 10. 
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E. CALIBRATION 
Calibrating the PRIME table to yield the approximate number of points a 
recruiter would receive had they accessed under the Success 2000 program was 
accomplished using historical recruiting data. We obtained five quarters worth of 
154 individual recruiter quotas and accession statistics from an average performing 
recruiting battalion, Albany, New York. We examined the actual production 
numbers and the amount of incentive points derived from that production based on 
Success 2000. These data were established as the baseline for the calibration. We 
inserted the historical production data into the PRIME table, assuming that the 
recruiters accurately predicted their accessions, and compared the two sets of 
incentive points data. This comparison showed that the initial points structure, 
represented in Figure 3.1, yielded lower incentive points than the old system and 
that if the PRIME table was implemented, as is, the recruiters would be worse off 
than under the old system. We continued to adjust the table in an attempt to 
standardize the incentive points derived by PRIME. No matter how the table was 
adjusted one group of recruiters were either better off or worse off than under the 
old system. 
Needing to focus the effort and compartmentalize the effects of changes to 
the table, we further categorized the recruiters so that we could focus on smaller 
sample sizes. From the historical data we broke the recruiters and stations into 
performance groups in order to categorize their production. The categories of 
groups are: above average (AA), average (A), below average (BA), and way below 
average (WBA). We assigned the same category designations to the stations 
wi~ the battalion that performed according to these designations. These groups 
were aligned so that each category of station, AA through WBA, had a 
representative recruiter from each category AA through WBA, included in their 
calculations (See Appendix C). 
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This group's historical data were used to calibrate the PRIME table. This 
grouping represented the most likely combinations and permutations of recruiters 
and stations a battalion might field. The best calibration configuration derived, 
yielded slightly higher points for an AA station and recruiters over the old system. 
The points were slightly lower for the BA and WBA stations as depicted in 
Appendix C. Figure 3.4 depicts the actual PRIME table that Albany is using for 
the beta test. 
GA: Otrly Incentive Award Point 19-Mar 
Prediction 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 50 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
2 80 90 70 50 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
p 3 110 120 130 110 90 70 50 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
r 4 140 150 160 170 150 130 110 90 70 50 40 40 40 40 
0 5 170 180 190 200 210 190 170 150 130 110 90 70 50 40 
d 6 200 210 220 230 240 320 290 260 230 200 170 140 110 80 
u 7 230 240 250 260 270 350 400 370 340 310 280 250 220 190 
c 8 260 270 280 290 300 380 430 470 440 410 380 350 320 290 
t 9 290 300 310 320 330 410 460 500 610 570 530 490 450 410 
i 10 320 330 340 350 360 440 490 530 640 710 670 630 590 550 
0 11 350 360 370 380 390 470 520 560 670 740 810 770 730 690 
n 12 380 390 400 410 420 500 550 590 700 770 840 920 880 840 
13 410 420 430 440 450 530 580 620 730 800 870 950 1,040 990 
14 440 450 460 470 480 560 610 650 760 830 900 980 1,070 1,160 
Figure 3.4~ Actual PRIME Table Supplied to the Albany, NY Battalion 
Source: Terasawa, 1996. 
F. STATION POINTS FOR NON-PRODUCERS 
In addition to the individual points a recruiter receives for an accession, 
USAREC currently awards a set of points called station points. Station points are 
awarded to all the recruiters in a station when the station achieves their monthly 
mission box production number. The amount of points is currently 50 per month. 
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Under PRIME, station points will equal the summation of the total points earned 
by each recruiter in the station, divided by the number of recruiters in the station. 
This approach will incentivise the station commander and the recruiters to increase 
production within the station because they are only constrained by their accession 
nwnbers. Station points are added to the individual recruiter's incentive bonus 
points at the end of each accounting period. The question is how should the points 
be applied based on individual recruiter performance? We considered four 
alternatives ranging from an equal share between all recruiters to shares just for 
recruiters that achieved their projection and none for those who did not produce 
any accessions. 
In the Table 3.1, X is their predicted accession, Tis the actual accession, Q 
is quota, NQ means they missed their quota, and ZERO means they accessed no 
recruits. Under plan A the station points would be equally applied to all station 
members at 40% of the total station points. This situation would effectively 
reward a recruiter with no accessions. Plan B would apply 50% of the station 
points to recruiters that produced and 10% to a non-producer. This situation 
would not give a recruiter who predicted and accessed what they planned any 
added incentive for their performance and would reinforce marginal performance 
for the NQ recruiter. Plan C would equally apply the station points to the Q and 
NQ performers, while not giving the ZERO performer any points. This would 
reinforce marginal performance and possibly overly disincentivise the non-
performer. Plan D would stagger the application of points from 60% for Q, to 
40% for NQ, to 0% for ZERO. This would appropriately reward and set apart the 
Q performer while rewarding the NQ performer and disincentivise the non-
performer. The ramifications of each plan is the effect it will have on recruiters' 
morale. We recommend that USAREC adopt plan A or plan B. Either of these 
plans will properly incentivise the recruiters. The question USAREC must answer 
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is whether negative incentive, i.e. no points for ZERO, is consistent with their 
command philosophy. 
Table 3.1. Station Point Award Decision Table. 
X>=T X>O X=O 
PLAN/ ACCESSION Q NQ ZERO 
A 0.4 0.4 0.4 
B 0.5 0.5 0.1 
c 0.54 0.54 0 
D 0.6 0.4 0 
Source: Terasawa, 1996. 
G. DELIVERED PRODUCT 
The PRIME system, as presented to USAREC, has several features that 
make it extremely user-friendly. Professor Terasawa built a Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) into the system that hides the spreadsheet calculations from the 
recruiters and awards personnel. 
The GUI screen has three options for the recruiter to choose, they are the 
Mission Target Entry, Print Summary, and the Actual Production Entry. Mission 
Target Entry (Figure 3.5) is a macro within the program that allows the recruiters 
to go in and work with the system to determine their optimum point range based 
on their assessment of their accessions. Figure 3.5 represents the Mission Target 
Entry screen. In this example, the recruiter expects to access nine GAs during the 
quarter and his expected award points equals 570. There could be any 
combination of categories of recruits depicted in the example to include ones from 
botli Regular Army and Army Reserve. The recruiters are not constrained in their 
predictions. 
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Figure 3.5. PRIME Mission Target Entry Screen 
Source: Terasawa, 1996. 
The next macro is the Print Summary. It simply prints out the predictions 
and any fmal points tables for the recruiters. The recruiters and awards personnel 
can use this printout to manually update their records or keep the records in a 
digital format. 
The final macro is the Actual Production Entry (Figure 3.6). This macro is 
where the recruiters input their actual perlmmance for the accounting period and 
the macro derives their incentive points. In this example, the recruiter actually 




Figure 3.6. PRIME Actual Production Entry Screen 
Source: Terasawa, 1996. 
Recruiting personnel have to input the recruiter's name, social security 
nmnber, and predictions to derive incentive award points. The program is 
interactive allowing the recruiters to work through different scenarios and 
predictions to determine where their best reward for predictions exist. At the end 
of the accounting period, the awards clerk only needs to input the actual 
production, by category, of each individual recruiter and the program will 
calculate incentive award points. These points are applied towards the recruiter 
awards in the same fashion as under Success 2000. These data are stored in a 
database for the unit and are assessable as needed. The system is much more user-
friendly than the old system and it is easier to assess and evaluate the possible 
rec~iting scenarios under PRIME. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the concept of PRIME as a system designed to build 
on the strengths of the Success 2000 program that adds a dimension of self-
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selection and ownership of the accession mission for an individual recruiter. The 
PRIME concept reasons that on-production recruiters have the best market data 
available in their regions of operation and they can best determine their level of 
output. The challenge is to have them self-select a level of output that challenges 
themselves and their markets. The PRIME system has several features that answer 
this challenge. They are that the system has a truth-telling mechanism, efficiency-
enhancing system, and a jump-point incentive award point system. 
The truth-telling mechanism is when a recruiter predicts a specific number 
of anticipated recruits within a time period and they are motivated to attain that 
number by the points structure. The points are aligned such that, a recruiter must 
access the number they originally predict in order to attain the optimum number of 
incentive points. The system is efficiency-enhancing because given their 
predictions at the beginning of an accounting period, if they fall short of the 
prediction they lose incentive award points. If they overproduce they gain 
incentive award points. Therefore, a recruiter gains a proportionally larger share of 
points if they overproduce compared to a proportionally smaller number of points 
for underproduction. The optimum number of points a recruiter can receive is 
when they accurately predict and access their prediction number. This incentive 
structure motivates the recruiter to be as accurate as possible in their original 
predictions. The jump-point is the point where the incentive award points for 
accessions increase substantially over the previous level. This is a number of 
accessions per accounting period, identified by USAREC, where they want the 
recruiters to focus their predictions and efforts. These are the positions on the 
table where recruiters will maximize their incentive award points. We are 
counting on human nature to strive towards the performance level that yields the 
greatest reward. 
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The points for the original PRIME table are based on the Incentive Award 
Point Update, 1st Quarter FY1996, Appendix B. The table is designed to 
incorporate all the points a recruiter can receive under Success 2000 including 
shipping points, commanders bonus points, the varying point structure for specific 
categories of recruits, and DEP losses. The points for specific categories of 
recruits are derived using an awards multiplier that reflects the relative weighting 
of each category of recruit. These weightings are applied to a base points matrix 
that represents the points received for a GA accession. The matrix was calibrated 
using actual recruiter accession data from the Albany, New York recruiting 
battalion. We used five quarters worth of 154 individual recruiters data. This data 
was established as the baseline for the calibration of the system. This data was 
inserted into the original PRIME table and compared to the points derived under 
Success 2000, this process was repeated several times until a close approximation 
of points was achieved. 
The station points were considered next in the process. The problem was 
how to apply the points to varying levels of production. Should a non-producer 
receive the same number of station points as a recruiter that produces? We derived 
four scenarios to delineate the points breakdown and recommended a plan to 
evenly apply the points at a 40% level to all recruiters within a station. 
Finally, the points matrix was calibrated and it was provided to the Albany, 
New York recruiting battalion in a software package. The software package has a 
Graphical User Interface (GUI), that allows the recruiters to use the program 
without having to actually enter the spreadsheet and manipulate the program. The 
package allows the users to input data fields such as the recruiters name, social-
security number, predictions, station, and final production. All the data are stored 
in the software allowing easy access and manipulation. Recruiters also have the 
ability to enter the system and game their predictions. They can determine what 
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level of prediction will produce their optimum amount of points based on their 
production. . From this determination, they predict their performance and strive 




This chapter will define a methodology to implement the PRIME system within 
USAREC focusing on the battalion level of command and how they train and track the 
system. We will consider the training issues surrounding the system, how to provide 
incentive points to station commanders and staff members, the bidding process, and 
the command and control mechanisms necessruy to implement PRIME. We will also 
address several command concerns that surround the program and what to realistically 
expect from the recruiters. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementing and training on-production recruiters to use PRIME within 
the current system is not a difficult task. PRIME will work within the current 
accession system. The structure of Success 2000 and the tracking and support 
systems involved in its execution lend themselves to supporting PRIME. The 
difficult aspect of implementing PRIME is changing the attitudes surrounding the 
derivation of USAREC's accession mission and training on-production recruiters 
to conduct realistic market analysis. PRIME is a bottom-up driven accession 
system. In the past, USAREC has conducted market analysis for the country, 
based on the DCSPER mission requirement, and forced down quotas based on 
what they expected each area to access. The key point is not the question of how 
the recruiters derive their individual accession mission, but do the total accessions 
match or exceed the number DCSPER directed USAREC to access to support the 
fumr.e end-strength of the Army? 
1. Training Focus 
PRIME is a bottom-up driven accession system. Consequently, it is 
imperative that the on-production recruiters know how to properly assess their 
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markets to make an educated projection of accessments. To support the PRIME 
concept, it is necessary for all the players from the on-production recruiters to their 
supervisors, commanders, and especially the persmmel assessing the accessions to 
understand the system and how to track its progress. The training plan USAREC 
implements should emphasize the methods on-production recruiters use to analyze 
their market share data by zip code, teach them to do lead line calculations, fill out 
the DA Form 533 and 635, conduct lead source analysis, and manipulate the 
PRIME software. Recruiters are aware of these skills. It is necessary for them to 
be intimately familiar with the techniques. It is no longer practical for their higher 
command to do all the market analysis for them and direct their accessions 
accordingly. This type of analysis is not timely nor does it take advantage of the 
knowledge the recruiters have of their geographic region. 
The station commanders should be trained in the art of eliciting the most 
realistic predictions possible from their on-production recruiters. This process 
involves motivating the recruiters as individuals and as a station team, knowing the 
market, and managing time. An experienced recruiter, under a station commander, 
who is familiar with analyzing market share, doing lead line calculations and 
conducting lead source analysis can make a relatively accurate prediction of their 
future accessions. The focus of the station commander with the experienced 
recruiter is to insure they predict high enough on the matrix to challenge their 
skills and the market. With inexperienced recruiters, the station commander must 
review the logic behind their prediction. They must review the zip code market 
analysis, historical trends within the station for the upcoming time frame, review 
the lead source analysis, and review their lead line calculations. After the station 
commander is convinced that the recruiter knows how to conduct the analysis and 
that the analysis is correct, he should assist the i~experienced recruiter in 
determining his prediction. Motivating the station to operate as a team 
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is a primary focus of Success 2000 and this focus should continue to prevail in the 
conduct of everyday business. Time management techniques, such as the DA 
Forms 533 and 635, are in place in all stations. These techniques should continue. 
The focus for time management from the station commander's perspective should 
shift from dictating activities to tracking recruiter activities in order to support 
PRIME. 
2. Staff and Station Incentive Points 
The company, battalion and brigade staff elements will calculate their 
incentive points by taking the sum of the total incentive points earned by the 
stations within the command, then divide by the number of on-production 
recruiters in the command. This process averages the production performance of 
all the on-production recruiters in a unit. This technique will motivate the staff 
elements to focus their efforts on the areas in the command that are the weakest 
and can yield the greatest overall affect on the on-production recruiters success. 
Under Success 2000, it is possible for the staff and stations within a 
command to earn quarterly mission box points. That type of incentive point 
accrual can continue under PRIME, at a price. The system can continue under the 
following scenario. The rolled-up predictions of the recruiters in the stations 
equals the commands mission for the quarter. If each individual recruiter meets or 
exceeds their prediction for the quarter then the unit within the command will 
receive the quarterly mission box points. If one recruiter does not meet their 
prediction then the unit will not receive the points. The individual pressure derived 
by the prospect of causing the entire group to lose mission points can be extreme. 
This pressure is internalized by a recruiter and brought about because of peer 
pressure. This type of pressure could help to motivate recruiters to access recruits. 
The price of this type of system is that it will disincentivise the recruiters 
from making realistic predictions of their perfonnance. The internalized pressure 
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derived from the prospect of causing the entire group to lose their quarterly 
mission box points will cause the recruiters to predict below their markets 
potential. It will become more important to attain their prediction and not let 
down the command rather than realistically predict what the market can yield. 
This process will destroy the benefits of PRIME. 
3. Bidding Process 
The bidding procedures are straight forward. Approximately one month 
before the beginning of a new quarter the RSC will meet with the individual 
recruiters and review their market share data, conduct production counseling, and 
conduct analysis of their market before the actual "bidding." The key to success in 
the bidding process is to make a realistic bid, based on the recruiter's knowledge 
of the market and realizing that the bid is the recruiter's "best guess" of what they 
can actually accomplish. There is no penalty for not accessing the number of 
recruits bid, other than a reduced number of incentive award points and peer 
pressure. An experienced recruiter will take all the information and prepare a bid 
for each individual category for the quarter. An inexperienced recruiter will 
consult with the RSC to come up with a realistic figure taking into account, the 
recruiter's ability and market share. After this process, the bid is then finalized 
and signed by the recruiter and station commander. The recruiter and station 
commander then have a contract and the recruiter owns the bid at this point and is 
responsible to plan and execute his work schedule to accomplish the prediction. 
This information is consolidated for the station, forwarded up to the company for 
consolidation, and then forwarded to the battalion. 
During the implementation phase of PRIME, the battalion should compare 
the prediction figures to the accession mission directed from USAREC to insure 
the PRIME derived mission supports the DCSPER derived mission. If there is a 
discrepancy between the two then the Commander has two options. If the bids are 
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greater than the DCSPER mission, he can suggest lowering the missions if he fills 
based on his analysis that the recruiting force is setting themselves up for failure. 
In the case of the Albany recruiting battalion, their first bidding produced bids 
higher than their USAREC quota for the quarter. If the bids are lower than the 
DCSPER mission then the points on the PRIME matrix may need refmement by 
USAREC or the market analysis for the region should be reassessed. Both of 
these options must be reviewed before conducting another bidding session. After 
PRIME is totally implemented and the historical data on regions is compiled, the 
comparisons and possible re-bidding will not be necessary. 
4. Command and Control 
The command and control mechanisms currently in place at station, 
company, and battalion level will remain in place. There is no need to change the 
recruiter progress tracking procedures in order to implement PRIME. The only 
change is that tracking and time management planning must be done by each 
individual recruiter. This should make the job of the company and battalion easier 
because now the reporting information and records are derived at the lowest level 
and it is a matter of compiling and quality checking the information. 
C. COMMAND CONCERNS 
1. Expectations 
The bidding process represent the recruiters' "best guess" of their 
experience and· performance. It is not realistic to expect all the recruiters to 
access the number of recruits they predicted. The predictions the recruiters are 
making should maximize their market's potential if they are predicting the 
maximum available recruits in the region. If the recruiters bid the full market 
potential, approximately 50% of the recruiters will achieve or exceed their 
prediction and the rest will not achieve their predictions. It is up to the individual 
recruiters to manage their time and resources effectively to access recruits on a 
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glide path consistent with their projections. The recruiters are expected to take 
into accooot any foreseeable absences from the station and any other factors that 
will affect their ability to recruit. PRIME is a system that derives its efficiency 
from the knowledge of the experts in the foxhole and we will allow them to do 
their job in their own way with limited oversight. 
2. Recruit In-processing 
Under PRIME, in a quarterly accoooting period, a recruit can be carried 
over into the next month without penalty. Recruiters attempt to expedite 
accessments at the end of accoooting periods in order to make a cut-off date. This 
situation causes many recruits to be rushed through the system on the last day of 
the month, which backs up the in-processing system. They have to wait hours for 
a physical and processing and this causes them to become frustrated and some 
decide not to join the Anny. This situation occurs so that a recruiter can make an 
arbitrary accoooting cut off date. Under PRIME, recruits can be carried over and 
processed professionally, in a manner that will make them think well of the 
military and cause them to fulfill their obligation. We expect the PRIME system 
to allow the recruiters to focus on quality recruits and give them the time necessary 
to properly track and close a contract. 
The situation described above happens at the end of every month under 
Success 2000. Under PRIME, the situation will happen quarterly. The question is 
how backed up will the in-processing system be and how many recruits will 
experience this situation? The simple act of reducing the number of accoooting 
periods will reduce the number of frustrated recruits. If the recruiters are properly 
managing their time, the numbers of recruits rushed through the system will be 
reduced. It is better to give recruiters more time between accoooting periods and 
allow them the opportWlity to manage their accessions properly. 
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3. Quality of Life 
If Commanders allow recruiters to manage their own time, as long as they 
are accessing up to their predictions, it will increase their quality of life. Quality 
of life is a difficult command concern to measure. In our opinion, quality of life is 
the ability of a recruiter to set their own schedule, take leave, attend school, and 
access quality recruits in a professional manner. The recruiters within USAREC 
who access their predictions under PRIME should be given the latitude to set their 
own schedules after making their prediction. Any extra accessions over their 
prediction are at the discretion of the recruiters based on their work ethic and 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will make our conclusions and recommendations for the 
PRIME program to USAREC. All new activities and programs within the Army 
are focused o~ and support the vision of Force XXI. Many new programs that 
cannot show a direct linkage to Force XXI, or that specifically support and 
complement this visio~ do not receive funding. We will discuss the Army's 
concept of Force XXI and how the application of PRIME to the recruiting process 
supports the vision of the Army in the future. 
B. FORCEXXI 
Force XXI is the former Chief of Staff of the Army's vision of the future of 
the Army that answers many of the problems faced in today' s dynamic strategic 
environment. It is a template for the fundamental changes in doctrine, 
organizatio~ and training happening within the Army today and is embraced by 
the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer. The former 
Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sulliv~ in 1995 stated: 
Force XXI is the reconceptionalization and redesign of the force at 
all echelons, from the foxhole to the industrial base, to meet the 
needs of a volatile and ever-changing world. It will be a force 
organized around information and information technologies. The 
central and essential feature of this Army will be its ability to exploit 
information. Information and digital technologies are creating such a 
synergistic effect among all the operation systems, organizations and 
components that the Army's capability will be enhanced by an order 
of magnitude. 
·,Soldiers are the most important element of Force XXI. It is through 
quality soldiers that the full power of technology will be realized. 
Only intelligent, physically fit, highly motivated, educated, and well-
trained soldiers can leverage technology to its fullest potential. 
The critical challenge for the Army as we create Force XXI, is to 
remain trained and ready, while growing more capable. To achieve 
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Force XXI, we must change our outmoded ways, retain continuity of 
our essential Army values, and promote growth of our capabilities 
(Army Chief of StaffBriefmg, 1995). 
To support this vision of "Trained and Ready," the total Army is focusing 
on six imperatives that must be maintained to complete the package. Of these 
imperatives, quality people is at the top of the list (Figure 5-l ). 
I m!JNrnG 
¢:::'1 MODERN EQUIPMENT 
FORCE MIX DOCTRINE 
Figure 5.1. Six Army Imperatives to Support Force XXI 
Source: TRADOC, 1996. 
In order to support Force XXI and their portion of the imperatives, the 
DCSPER, derived a mission statement that states, "The U. S. Army designs the 
21st centwy force (Force XXI) beginning now to achieve related fielding and 
support decisions by the year 2000 to fully field the total Army force that is 
capable of meeting our Nation's 21st centwy challenges, from foxhole to factory." 
He plans to accomplish this by working through his concept of the "Personnel 
Lifecycle." The Personnel Lifecycle consists of six interrelated processes: 
structure, acquire, train, distribute, sustain, and separate. These processes 
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influence each other and apply to all three components of the Army, active, 
reserve, and civilian. The challenge, as the DSCPER perceives it, is for the 
organization to realize that change is acceptable. He directs that the personnel 
directorates adapt new systems through experimentation as the Army of the future 
begins to take shape (DCSPER Briefmg, 1995). 
The direction the DCSPER gave for the Acquire piece of the Personnel 
Lifecycle focuses specifically on USAREC. He predicts that the requirements for 
quality soldiers will be greater in the Force XXI Army than in the Army of the 
past. To acquire these personnel, it requires a highly skilled and specialized 
recruiting command to acquire the types of people necessruy to employ the future 
warfighting systems. USAREC must develop efficient recruiting activities 
equipped with the most modem technology to fill the requirements for the active, 
reserve, and civilian components. 
The future force projections for the Army are not stable. Under a steady 
state, the end of year force = beginning force + accessions - separations, that is not 
necessarily the case today because our force projections are changing from year to 
year. The dynamic aspect of the force projections makes USAREC's job much 
more difficult. USAREC must endeavor to implement an accession system that 
can be as dynamic as the environment and change accession numbers with 
minimal effort. Current trends indicate that on-production recruiters of the future 
must be more efficient and must make more contracts to recruit the correct 
quantity and quality of force. PRIME addresses the DCSPER' s concerns of 
efficiency and flexibility and adds a dimension of equal incentive for equal work 
and accurate data collection. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
All the programs the Army and their support activities implemented must 
support the Force XXI concept to be viable and survive the scrutiny of the budget 
review. PRIME accomplishes this requirement. 
The PRIME system has the necessary characteristics incorporated into its 
body to push recruiters towards their maximum efficiency. Based on the 
preliminary data provided by the Albany Recruiting Battalion, their recruiters self-
selected a mission that satisfied their DCSPER accession mission. They are 
performing better under PRIME during the 3rd quarter of FY1996 than they 
performed at the same time last year. These facts support the contention that 
PRIME can motivate recruiters to access recruits up to the true market potential of 
their assigned geographic area and have them accomplish the mission consistent 
with their accession glide path. When the fmal . data arrive for the 3rd and 4th 
quarter ofFY1996 a substantiated determination can be made. 
PRIME can be implemented within the current system without changing the 
organizational structure or reporting structure of USAREC. The primary focus of 
USAREC should be on training the on-production recruiters to analyze their 
market share data by zip code, teach them to do lead line calculations, fill out the 
DA Form 533 and 635, conduct lead source analysis, and manipulate the PRIME 
software. Specific attention needs to be paid to the training of the station 
commanders to ensure they know how to motivate recruiters to choose the most 
realistic prediction possible. Tools the station commanders can use to motivate the 
recruiters are incentive points or cash. 
Using cash as a motivation tool has been explored in previous literature and 
it was determined that it could have an averse effect on the recruiting system. This 
is because of the recruiter's perception that the recruiting environment would 
become too aggressive and stymie the teaming trends currently in vogue under 
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Success 2000. Cash as an incentive is not allowed by DoD regulation. Using the 
incentive award points is the best method of motivating the recruiters under the 
current system. The incentive award points system already exists and it is 
relatively easy to restructure the system to support the PRIME concept. The 
incentive points available to recruiters and staff support personnel are easily 
manipulated to place a focus on the particular level of accessions where USAREC 
needs individual recruiters to access for an accounting period. This manipulation 
can be changed based on accession input from the DCSPER, without having to 
revise the total system. 
The DCSPER' s accession input for the year is reviewed by USAREC and 
divided among the recruiting brigades within the United States as quotas. PRIME 
can, over time, increase the efficiency of this function. Measuring the predictions 
of the recruiters within a geographic area versus their actual accessions will yield 
an average and a standard deviation from the average over time. These data are 
more accurate than the data USAREC is currently using. The new data will allow 
USAREC to recognize when an area is not performing up to their capability and 
spur them to look for factors effecting the situation. They will also allow 
USAREC to better allocate their resources, focusing on areas that has the most 
potential to reap benefits for the command. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
We recommend that USAREC continue with the current beta test and 
consider expanding the PRIME system to a brigade level command. Expanding 
the test is predicated on the outcome of the current test. There are several tangible 
~&s to consider · when evaluating the beta test data: individual recruiter 
performance, actual accession performance versus the predictions, actual accession 
performance versus historical performance, DEP loss rate, steady accession flow 
throughout the test period, and contract quality, to name a few. There are several 
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intangible areas that need consideration: recruiter quality of life and quality of the 
accessions being processed. 
PRIME will increase the efficiency of USAREC and increase the quality of 
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591.3 516.3 563.1 628.0 721.4 573.2 500.1 ~&4.3 445.3 438.3 430.7 394.0 374.6 408.1 400.1 416.6 379.1 380.11 379.0 
130191 145337 142316 125445 135521 133000 115220 120551 19619 71243 77513 77.563 61031 62931 70000 90471 8458! 11!1419 
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APPENDIX B. SUCCESS 2000 POINT SHEET (1ST QUARTER 1996) 
USAREC'S SUCCESS2000 
RECRUITING EDGE 
Incentive Award Point Update 1st Qtr FV 96 
Individual Recruiter Production Points Awarded In Addition To Station Mission Box Points. If Station 
Mission Box Not Achieved, Individual Recruiter Production Point Values Are Awarded 
All RA Accessions and USAR NPS Shippers 
20 Points 
*Company/Battalion Guidance Counselors (QC)R/t:lOIE):~:::;~a~~ Recruiter Points awarded, Divided By the A Production Recruiters. 
-consolidated MEPS G/C Points Will be the Aggregate of Recruiter 
Assigned to Those Battalions Supported by the MEPS. 
*Production Point Value of Contract Category 
57 
This flyer represents all points currently in 
effect. If you have any questions about the 
points system contact: 

































































20 Stp 0.1 
20 sJ 0.4 
LJ 0.3 
w/CG PRIME 
Qtr Bn w/ Shipper 
Pts Acce'n Pts 
40 10% 20 Pred 
1 
340 5 440 5 
340 5 440 5 
310 4 390 4 




310 4 390 4 
310 4 390 4 
280 3 340 3 
220 1 240 1 
12 
1 
290 5 390 5 
230 3 290 3 
170 1 190 1 
170 1 190 1 
140 0 140 0 
10 
60 2 100 2 
60 2 100 2 
30 1 50 1 
30 1 50 1 
-----· 
Pts1 Pts2 Pts3 Pts4 
Team 
w/ Shipper work ~ Pts Pts Diff t 
Prod 20 1.50 
230 
5 190 290 290 520 80 190 190 190 1 
5 190 290 290 520 80 190 190 190 1 
4 150 230 230 460 70 150 150 150 1 I 
2 70 110 110 340 50 70 70 70 1 i 
-10 20 20 c ~ 
600 280 
170 
4 150 230 230 400 10 150 150 150 1 
4 150 230 230 400 10 150 150 150 1 
3 110 170 170 340 0 110 110 110 1 ~ 
1 30 50 50 220 -20 30 30 30 1 





5 190 290 290 400 10 190 190 190 1 
3 110 170 170 280 -10 110 110 110 1 
1 30 50 50 160 -30 30 30 30 1 
1 30 50 so 160 -30 30 30 30 1 
0 0 0 Q 110 -30 -10 20 20 0 






2 70 110 110 180 80 70 70 70 1 
2 70 110 110 180 ·so 70 70 70 1 
1 30 50 50 120 70 30 30 30 1 
1 30 50 50 .~ 70 30 30 30 1 -- --- -
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